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Consolidation of Power: The use of executive orders, proclamations and signing
statements during the George W. Bush Presidency
Steve Anderson

Introduction
Like other Presidents before him, George W. Bush used his executive authority to craft
policy both domestically and internationally. During both of his terms, he issued executive
orders, executive proclamations, and used signing statements as a way to influence policies and
assert the authority of the executive branch. Over the course of his two terms in office, President
Bush was dealt a series of challenges, including terrorists attacks, war, and natural disasters. His
use of executive power has changed the federal government and expanded executive authority.
These were not without controversy, as some of his decisions have been met with criticism, legal
challenges, and the repeal of some executive orders by his successor, President Obama.
Researching the use of these executive tools helps to understand how the executive branch
operates within and how it affects other branches and departments of the federal government.
These actions of the executive branch can have profound consequences, such as Lincoln’s
Emancipation Proclamation of Franklin Roosevelt’s order to place Japanese-American citizens in
internment camps.
In studying President Bush’s use of signing statements, executive orders and
proclamations, I plan to analyze the number of orders and proclamations, how they affected the
scope of his authority, and how it was received by Congress and the courts. An executive order
can be described as a rule or order issued by the president to an executive branch of the
government having the force of law. An executive proclamation is “an instrument that states a
condition, declares a law and requires obedience, recognizes an event or triggers the
1
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implementation of a law” (Cooper 2005, 116). A signing statement is a written pronouncement
issued by the President of the United States upon the signing of a bill into law.
Literature Review
Examining the use of executive orders, proclamations, and signing statements has built a
large body of research analyzing the effect of these tools on presidential power. While there have
been a few examples of executive orders that have carried substantial weight legally and policy
wise, its use has been primarily for routine and minor administrative tasks (Mayer 1999). Many
of the major policies that have been enacted via executive order have been studied by examining
legal challenges filed against them and the resulting verdicts issued by the court system.
In the case of President Bush, scholarly work on his use of executive power, including
signing statements, executive orders and proclamations, has been over some of the more
controversial orders given during his first term in office. Several of those executive orders
issued have been challenged in court. The resulting litigation and court decisions have provided a
body of research to examine how this has affected certain policies put out by the President.
Executive orders were issued in the domestic policy area, but often the most far reaching
involved foreign policy. These orders include the Military Order of November 13, 2001, which
set up the Military Commission system to try non-citizens accused of terrorism. This particular
order has been subject to serious scrutiny, as there has been controversy surrounding as to
whether this order has resulted in detainees being subject to legalized torture, denial of due
process, and violations of the Geneva Convention (Bassiouni 2006). A series of court challenges
followed this and other orders related to national security.
Presidential proclamations are often symbolic in nature, but some have carried large legal
and policy implications. Historical examples include Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation and
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Nixon’s wage and price freeze (Rottinghaus 2007). Proclamations have been used to declare
disaster areas, including the areas affected by hurricane Katrina in 2005. The government’s
failure on handling the rescue operations after the hurricane had a serious affect on his
Presidency, which he took personal blame for the mistakes made at the federal level (Sylves
2006).
Scholars have noted during his first term, President Bush didn’t use his veto power on
any bill (Cooper 2005). However, his use of a tool known as a signing statement, issued the
presidents opinion on certain parts of the legislation and as a result the parts the president may
find unconstitutional. This technique isn’t the same as a veto, but it falls under the line of items
that the president may not enforce. A 2006 news report stated that President Bush had used
signing statements on up to 750 provisions of various bills, questioning the constitutionality of
different parts of each bill (Kelly 2007). While President Bush’s signing statements in his first
term have been analyzed, there isn’t an equal amount of work on his second term. Since
President Bush has only been out of office for two years as of this writing, his use of signing
statements, executive orders, and proclamations from his second term, along with their
respective implications, have received less analysis than his first term.
While the policies of President Bush’s first term have been analyzed in large detail, the
policies of the second term have largely been not studied. Considering both the relatively brief
period of time since President Bush left office, there isn’t much research on the effects of his use
of executive authority on the organization of the executive branch. As time goes on, it should be
taken into account whether President Obama continues to use some of the policies implemented
during the Bush administration. This particular research looks to compare the impact of
executive orders, proclamations and signing statements in his second term to his first. Comparing
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the two terms will seek the measure whether the second term had as much impact on the power
of the office as the first term.
Methodology
To help research these particular tools of the executive branch, I examined the federal
register which has the records of these on file, and will be used to compare the number of orders
and proclamations in both of President Bush’s terms. The Government Printing Office has
recorded Presidential signing statements. The text of these statements gives insight as to the
President’s view on certain parts of the legislation he signed into law. These all impact how
President Bush asserted his authority and his affect on policy.
Researching executive orders, proclamations, and signing statements requires analyzing
numerous case studies and document analysis to understand the size and scope of their impact on
the policy. The National Archives keep a detailed record of current and previous executive
orders dating back to the Roosevelt Administration. When analyzing the Presidency of George
W. Bush, it is noted he served two consecutive terms in office. This time ranges from January
20th, 2001 to January 19th 2005 as the first term and January 20th, 2005 to January 19th, 2009 as
the second term. They total 291 over two terms, 169 is his first term and 122 in his second term.
As the orders are separated into each year of Presidency, it is easy to study the types of issues
during election years and the times of major events (natural disasters, terrorist attack, etc…).
Several particular orders during the Bush Administration have been the focus of
academic study. These include the orders to set up military commissions for suspected terrorists
and Executive Order 13233, allowing former Presidents, Vice Presidents, and their families to
withhold information for twelve years after they leave office (Swartz 2008). Orders that have
generated controversy and/or legal challenges have a wide range of coverage, including legal
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briefs from the Administration and those who challenged the orders, government reports and
media coverage.
Executive proclamations, particularly those given by President George W. Bush, are
documented in the White House Archives; with the website listing Bush’s proclamations is
frozen as historical material. While many consider most proclamations as mostly symbolic,
scholarly research has documented and analyzed proclamations that have significant policy
impact, including declarations of emergency after September 11th and hurricane Katrina. Again,
this list is divided by the years and exact dates proclamations were announced, the proclamations
in election years, and the amount between his two terms in office. The majority of proclamations
from 1977 to 2005 have involved trade (Rottinghaus 2007). Both of President Bush’s terms have
numerous proclamations involving trade, emergencies, and symbolic events. Comparing and
contrasting the two terms requires examining the numbers of proclamations in each term, along
with critical analysis of the impact those proclamations had on President Bush’s influence in the
realm of domestic and foreign policy.
Signing statements have been used by numerous Presidents, indicating their particular
views on the bill being signed. President Bush had used signing statements on different bills,
much like his predecessors before him. The signing statement is seen as not only a way for the
President to voice views on the bills constitutionality, either in whole or in parts, but as a way to
guide the Executive Branch on how to administer and enforce aspects of the law (Kelly 2007).
Signing statements are usually printed along with the bill in United States Code
Congressional and Administrative News (Cooper 2005). Scholarly research has examined
President Bush’s use of signing statements in detail, citing specific statements that have
generated controversy. The total number of signing statements issued during the Bush
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Administration is issued in a report by the Congressional Research Service, numbering 152 in
total (Halstead 2007).
Research Findings
President Bush issued numerous executive orders during his first term that created a long
lasting impact on the nations both domestic and foreign policy. In the first year of his Presidency,
Bush issued fifty-four executive orders, the most of any year in both terms. President Bush
issued his first and second executive orders on January 29th, 2001. Executive Orders 13198 and
13199 established the White House Office of Faith Based and Community Initiatives (Federal
Register). This new office became part of the Executive Office of the President of the United
States. This agency was designed to strengthen faith-based and community organizations and
expand their capacity to provide federally-funded social services, with the idea having been that
these groups were well-situated to meet the needs of local individuals.
This office has come under controversy, as critics contend that the laws allowing the
office to provide federal dollars to fund religious organizations as a violation of the
Establishment Clause, and that the agency blurred the lines in regards to the separation of church
and state. The agency survived throughout the Bush administration and it still part of the Obama
Administration, although it has been renamed the White House Office of Faith-Based and
Neighborhood Partnerships and has been amended via President Obama’s own executive order.
President Bush would face the major test of his Presidency early, as the United States
suffered a terrorist attack on September 11th, 2001. After the attacks, President Bush issued a
series of executive orders that that would have an impact long after his Presidency ended.
Among these orders include Executive Order 13228, establishing the Office of Homeland
Security and the Homeland Security Council and 13239, establishing Afghanistan as a combat
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zone. The Office of Homeland Security incorporated twenty-two different departments,
including Immigration and Naturalization, Customs, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, the Secret Service and the Coast Guard.
President Bush made it America’s mission to do all that was possible to combat
terrorism. This included orders seizing the assets and blocking funding for groups suspected of
aiding terrorist organizations along with increased sharing of information among intelligence
agencies and the placing of suspected terrorist in detention at Guantanamo Bay. The Obama
Administration, although promising the close the facility, has yet to do so as of this writing.
Compared to his first term, Bush’s second term had fewer executive orders overall, with more
emphasis on funding for AIDS prevention, changing the Military Commissions System facing
legal challenges, and efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The uses of proclamations during President Bush’s two terms were symbolic in nature.
After the September 11th attacks, President Bush made proclamations on the 12th, 13th and 14th.
These include both National Days of Prayer and Remembrance for the victims and declared a
national state of emergency (White House archives). Through a proclamation, President Bush
managed to craft immigration policy. On January 12th of 2004, Bush issued a proclamation to
suspend entry as immigrants or nonimmigrants or persons engaged in or benefitting from
corruption. Bush also used proclamations to modify parts of numerous trade agreements.
The most dramatic use of the President’s emergency proclamation occurred after New
Orleans was devastated by Hurricane Katrina. Not only did President Bush declare a state of
emergency in the state of Louisiana, but to the states that took in Katrina evacuees, even if those
states had no damage from the storm (Sylves 2006). This was the first major use of an
emergency proclamation since the 9/11 attacks, when the administration began to use declaration
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of emergencies as an instrument of national security. This shift is strategy gave President Bush
more power in terms of dealing with a man-made or natural crisis. The Department of Home
Land Security was only two years old when its major test came in the form of the response to
Katrina.
With FEMA now incorporated into the DHS with other agencies responsible for disaster
relief, it was became a complex endeavor to figure out exactly where and how to properly deploy
National Guard troops, medical staff and emergency workers. President Bush’s complimentary
feelings about then FEMA director Michael Brown, along with a photo of the Bush looking
down at the damage from Air Force One hurt his credibility, already venerable after a close
reelection and defeat his major initiatives in the second term. It would later be found that many
of FEMA’s directors had no experience in dealing with emergency management and were
political supporters of the President (Sylves 2006). The first major exercise in crisis management
since the 9/11 terrorist attacks showed that the problems that occurred with realignment of
emergency management and national defense agencies. Comparing the handling of the terrorist
attacks to Hurricane Katrina, Bush lost credibility as an effective manager.
As the President is the chief executive officer the Executive Branch, he has major
influence in how administrative duties are carried out by the EOP. The signing statement, a
device used by Presidents to weigh in on laws generally, has been used by Bush much like is has
been used by his predecessors (Halstead 2007). Although he used the signing statement less than
President Clinton, more of Bush’s statements challenged the constitutionality of parts of bills
than Clinton’s. As Congress tried to reign in the power of the executive branch in terms of the
War on Terror, Bush responded with statements emphasizing that he would enforce the law “in a
manner consistent with the President’s constitutional authority to supervise the unitary executive
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branch and to withhold information the disclosure of which could impair foreign relations,
national security, the deliberative processes of the Executive, or the performance of the
Executive’s constitutional duties” (Patriot Act). President Bush’s use of signing statements over
the course of his presidency fits in well with his M.B.A style of executive management.
Discussion and Conclusions
President Bush, through the use of numerous tools available to the Executive Office of
the President, consolidated power within the executive branch while changing the size and scope
of the federal government. By using executive orders to create a large new Department in the
response to a terrorist attack, national security and emergency management, immigration and
intelligence agencies expanded and became integrated at levels unseen before in the history of
the federal government. With questions about deficit control dominating political news, many of
the features of the large security apparatus created by President Bush’s actions have come under
scrutiny; along the cost of maintaining troops is Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite the criticism and
promise for change, President Obama has kept and most likely will keep many of the same
policies in place. However, the botched response to Katrina has led to reforms to better manage
the agencies, including filling executive positions with those experienced in emergency
management, along with more clarity and communication between different agencies to
coordinate disaster responses.
Many of the issues that began under Bush still linger today, including how to deal with
suspected terrorist who have been captured. The Military Commissions System created by
Bush’s executive order has come under harsh criticism from academics for failing to protect the
rights of U.S. citizens and prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention. Research shows the
historical use of civilian courts to try suspected terrorists have proven to be more effective and
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legitimate than those tried under the Military Commission System. Despite numerous court
challenges and calls to use the civilian court system, Guantanamo Bay still houses prisoners who
have yet to receive a trial. In the terms of executive authority, the ability to determine suspects as
enemy combatants and hold special legal proceedings gives the executive branch more power
than some believe the Constitution and statute provide.
Since many of the issues that began during the Bush Administration continue during the
Obama Administration, it’s very likely that those issues involving suspected terrorists and DHS
will be further explored both through the legislative process and the courts. Further research into
the DHS and its effectiveness in terms of safety and dollars spent is necessary to examine
whether creating the large and complex office has proven to be useful in achieving its goals.
Legal scholars have and will continue to examine the use of the Military Commissions System
and the detention of suspected terrorists. Further research can determine whether or not using the
special legal system can be an effective tool to administer justice or should be disbanded and left
to civilian courts.
The Presidents signing statements are a window into the mind of how the President
believes his branch should operate, along with his views on issues presented in numerous bills.
The mindset of an administrator can determine how a particular office can change operations and
procedures due to the chief executives personality, education and professional history. Since
President Bush was the first M.B.A, but will most likely not be the last, his style of management
will serve as an example of a more business minded model of government to compare to future
Presidents of a similar background. Although every President manages the office a different way,
Bush’s style will be studied in the future as a model for executives in the future in terms of
administrative control and consolidation of power within the Executive Office.
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LGBT Adoptions in the US & South Africa
Samantha Moore

Introduction
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender, most commonly referred to as LGBT, have
become a subject of controversy over the past decade. LGBT adoptions may not seem important
to someone who does not identify themselves in this category, but it is a crucial topic of
discussion. This topic is particularly relevant in today’s society because gay relationships and
unions are becoming more common, whereas back in the 1950’s and 1960’s, having a gay
relationship was considered tumultuous and an ultimate sin. With the increased commonality of
gay relationships and unions, there is a growing conversation about adoption, and whether or not
LGBT people are able to care for a child the same way a heterosexual man and/or woman can.
The purpose of this paper is not to sway your opinion of LGBT adoptions, but instead, to simply
lay out the realities of the issue.
Before I get into the mechanics of LGBT adoptions, the types of adoptions should be
recognized. There are currently three different types of LGBT adoptions; they are as follows,
individual adoptions, joint adoptions and second-parent adoptions. Individual adoption is when a
gay or lesbian individual wishes to adopt a child. Joint adoption is described as a gay or lesbian
couple choosing to adopt a child. Lastly, a second-parent adoption is when the partner of a gay or
lesbian parent wishes to adopt their partners child, thus making them their step-child (National
Adoption Center 2012).
According to the ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union), there are currently thirty-four
states that lack statewide legislation, case law, or department regulation addressing LGBT
1
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adoption. In those thirty-four states, it is up to the judge, the adoption agency, and the individual
social worker to decide whether the LGBT adoption should occur, meaning that those three
people determine if a non-traditional (LGBT) family will be able to adopt. This lack of
statewide legislation makes the issue of LGBT adoptions crucial to understand in order to figure
out what can be done to allow more LGBT adoptions to take place. Since discretion is left up to
the judge, the adoption agency, and the social worker, discrimination will without a doubt ensue.
If a gay couple wanted to adopt a child in Texas, which is one of the thirty-four states who lack
LGBT adoption legislation, they would almost immediately be turned down and dismissed. The
reasoning behind it is simply because Texas is opposed to homosexual relationships, unions, and
adoptions. If Texas were to allow LGBT adoptions, it would violate the state ban against
adoption by unmarried couples. The thirty-four states that lack legislation make it incredibly
difficult for LGBT people to adopt because those states base their opinions of LGBT adoptions
on a pure bias, which is further fueled by gay discrimination.
The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force provide an insightful look into anti-adoption
laws. As of April 21 2011, there are five states that restrict LGBT adoptions, those states are
Florida, Nebraska, Mississippi, Michigan, and Utah. Mississippi, Nebraska, and Florida have
legislation that strictly prohibits adoption in any form by same-sex couples. Michigan has
legislation that prohibits same-sex couples who are married to jointly adopt. Utah’s legislation
prohibits adoption by a person who is cohabitating in a relationship that is not a legally valid and
binding marriage.
Lambda Legal, a national organization known worldwide for providing equality and
recognition for LGBT persons, states that there are roughly 250,000 children being raised by
same-sex couples. While 250,000 may not seem like a staggering number, considering we have
2
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cities throughout the United States with much larger populations, it is, in many ways, a
milestone. In a recent court case, which has not yet been heard by the Supreme Court, Adar v
Smith (2011), describes a same-sex male couple that legally adopted a child, but were denied a
new birth certificate that would list both parents as the child’s father because Louisiana doesn’t
recognize adoption by unmarried parents. The Fifth Circuit Court sided with the couple when
the panel of three judges all agreed unanimously that both adoptive men be listed as parents.
When the defendant’s attorney asked for a rehearing, the Fifth Circuit Court reversed their
decision and this case has now been referred to the Supreme Court (Denniston 2011). LGBT
couples reach milestones, but sometimes, they don’t always follow through. This case is a prime
example of LGBT rights being accepted, to only then be brought back down. There are 250,000
same-sex couples as parents, but those 250,000 same-sex couples who are parents and did not
have a child biologically, have to fight incredibly hard to gain their parental rights.
Richman discusses the positions and problems with LGBT adoptions and LGBT custody.
She states that:
“When extended to the arena of family law, the characterization of rights as all
important is problematized. While rights are generally invoked on the individual level, a
family is by definition relational. This dichotomy is particularly at issue here, as the gay
rights movement has often been typified by citizenship claims connoted by individual
privacy rights, as in the struggle to decriminalize sodomy and the Lawrence v. Texas
(2003) decision. Furthermore, gay men and lesbians have often, in public discourse,
assumed to be uninterested in or incapable of family life-thus emphasizing the personal
and individualistic appearance of gay rights claims.”
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Richman makes a viable point in her argument; she argues that gay and lesbian rights are
under shadowed by those of heterosexual orientation, and that we have preconceived notions that
LGBT persons are incapable of being able to have a family. Sadly, she is correct in her
arguments, which aren’t just limited to the United States, but also stretch across the country as
well.
Comparative Case Study Analysis
LGBT adoptions aren’t just an issue within the United States, in fact, they spread
throughout the world. LGBT adoptions in other countries also have three main types of
adoptions; individual adoptions, joint adoptions and second-parent adoptions. However, not
every country accepts LGBT adoptions, in fact, in Africa alone; the only country who fully
accepts LGBT adoptions wholeheartedly is South Africa.
According to Oswin, the lobbying efforts in South Africa through the NCGLE
(National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality), has had the following result:
“As a result of this lobbying effort, South Africa became the first country in the
world to constitutionally entrench the rights of homosexuals, and the Coalition could lay
claim to the rather unique distinction of having included gay and lesbian issues in a
liberation struggle.”
Oswin recognizes that through the lobbying of the NCGLE, South Africa has gained
tremendous rights for LGBT people, and it is the first country throughout Africa to do so. The
lobbying efforts of the NCGLE is not the only reason why South Africa has rights for LGBT
people, but, it also has to do with the Children’s Act of 2005 and the court case, Du Toit and
Another v Minister of Welfare and Population Development and Others (2002). In the court case,
Du Toit, Suzanne du Toit and Anna-Marie de Vos, had been partners since 1989 and adopted two
4
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children in 1995, but, because South African law at the time did not allow unmarried partners to
adopt, de Vos was the children’s only legal parent. The decision of this case came down from
the Constitutional Court of South Africa which established that same-sex couples have the ability
to jointly adopt children. LGBT people had already been able to adopt children individually, but
only married couples could adopt jointly. This case paved the way for LGBT parents to be able
to adopt in South Africa, it also allowed non married couples to adopt, instead of just married
couples. The Children’s Act was enacted as a way to protect child rights, which included child
trafficking and making sure a child was placed into a suitable home. This Act did not
discriminate against LGBT couples/individuals, but instead embraced them and heterosexuals as
equals when it comes to adoption.
I chose South Africa as my country for my comparative study because it was one of the
few countries that fully accepted and embraced LGBT adoptions. It not only had acts and court
cases regarding the issue, but, it also had the lobbying group, NCGLE, which I thought provided
an interesting and unique perspective on how the LGBT movement came about in South Africa.
Not only is South Africa the only country in Africa to allow LGBT adoptions, it is one of the few
countries throughout the world that allows LGBT adoptions in all aspects, whether it be
individual adoptions, joint adoptions and second-parent adoptions, whereas in other countries,
they only allow either individual adoptions or only allow joint adoptions under marriage.
Analysis and Conclusion
When comparing South Africa to the United States, we see a very stark contrast in LGBT
rights in regards to adoption. South Africa takes into account LGBT rights within its entire
country, whereas in the United States, only some states have laws against LGBT adoptions and
the states without opposition; leave the ruling up to a third party. In various countries some
5
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allow LGBT adoptions, but only in certain jurisdictions, and the United States tends to lean the
same way. In Mississippi, LGBT adoption is strictly prohibited, but in Vermont, LGBT
adoptions could be allowed depending on the judge in charge of the adoption case. Mississippi
does not allow same-sex adoption because of their state constitution ruling it unconstitutional.
They also have no discrimination or hate crime protections against LGBT persons. Vermont
allows petitions to adopt because they have a different state constitution. South Africa allows
LGBT adoptions in their country, but in the United States, it is difficult to determine an enforced
set of policies unless dealing with the five states that have policies preventing it.
I think that the events leading up to LGBT adoption and LGBT rights in general, in South
Africa, have been of great importance in today’s society, but, in the United States, there have
been lobbying groups and even some state policies that prohibit LGBT adoption and they haven’t
made a huge impact to the country as a whole. If LGBT adoption rights are to be recognized like
they are in South Africa, then LGBT rights need to be written into our Constitution and not just
determined by state. If that were to happen, the argument can be made that South Africa is the
only country in Africa that has full LGBT adoption rights and is similar to states who are
lobbying for full LGBT adoption rights and states who prohibit it. LGBT adoption rights are
difficult to define for the entire country, and are being decided by states and other countries as
well.
No one approach is better than the other; they are too similar in nature to determine if one
is better than the other. LGBT adoptions are going to be a hot topic issue for an extended period
of time, and until drastic measures are taken, such as, writing LGBT adoptions into our
Constitution, it will always be an issue. According to Matter of Adoption of Camilla, 1994, as
quoted in Kimberly Richman’s article, a valid conclusion is offered,
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“To suggest that adoption petitions may not be filed by unmarried partners of the
same or opposite sex because the legislature has only expressed a desire for these
adoptions to occur in the traditional nuclear family constellation of the 1930’s ignores the
reality of what is happening in the population” (p. 285).
This quote sums up LGBT adoptions almost flawlessly, it concludes that LGBT adoptions are
happening and are an issue that will change the previous nuclear family dynamic. LGBT
adoptions are not going to go away or wither out, but instead, may very well become the new
traditional family.
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CIA: The Critical Years
Ryan Freer

Abstract
Our foreign policy agenda in the Middle East is attributed to the decisions of the CIA’s
Directors of Intelligence (DCI) and the Presidents they served. Overviewed here are two DCIs:
William Casey and George Tenet, and a third to a lesser degree, James Woolsey. In addition to
seeing how their tenures have impacted the Agency, the operations of the CIA in Iraq,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran in the decades leading up to the attacks of 9/11 culminated in this
tragedy. The paper that follows seeks to elaborate on how the CIA’s clandestine operations were
predecessors to the War on Terror, which has now spread to sub-Saharan Africa. The operations
overseen by Casey and Tenet inadvertently created a new enemy, the subculture that led to the
attack of 9/11, and the changing of today’s foreign policy decisions in the Arab world.
Creating the Enemy
The infamous day when the Twin Towers fell was the capstone on a long and insidious campaign
brought about by years of involvement by the Central Intelligence Agency in the Middle East.
The war in the Middle East did not begin on September 11, 2001, but had been an off and on
struggle dating back to the early 1950s with the installation of the Shah in Iran. Although
loosely connected to Iran, the United States supported Saddam Hussein leading up to the Second
Gulf War. Decades ago when these secret operation were first undertaken, the future was not of
concern; few realized that our once-allies could become our greatest enemies. To understand the
present, one must know the past, so as not to repeat it. The agendas of two Directors of Central
Intelligence (DCI) are the most apparent reactions of the operations they oversaw. Here, we will
examine the careers of William Casey and George Tenet, and how the Agency was changed after
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they left. In addition we will evaluate the relationships of the DCIs with the presidents they
served to see whether or not it had a drastic effect on the CIA’s operations. Ultimately, the CIA
delved into clandestine operations and inadvertently fostered a new enemy and their subculture
which in part caused 9/11. In reaction, the United States now have an expanding War on Terror
in Afghanistan, Northern Africa, and Pakistan.
“A Legacy of Lies”: William “Bill” Casey
William Casey was born in 1913 in New York. He held numerous roles in the public
realm, as well as the private. After achieving a law degree, he served in Europe in the Office of
Strategic Services OSS. When World War II ended, he practiced corporate law in New York
City, and even ran in the 1966 race for Congress in his district (where he lost). In the years to
come, he would serve on various committees and boards in Washington. In 1980 he served as
presidential nominee Ronald Reagan’s campaign manager, where he excelled and formed a very
close relationship with him (United States Senate 13). Casey was dismayed when he was offered
the position of Director of Intelligence; he had high hopes of becoming the Secretary of State.
‘You don’t look like Secretary of State. You don’t talk like Secretary of State. You only think
like one,’ National Security Advisor Richard Allen had told him (qtd. in Burn Before Reading
190).
When Casey was nominated to be the next DCI, he was an unlikely choice. In fact, most
were surprised that President Reagan had chosen him. As far as appearances go, he was
unkempt, foul and arrogant. For the face of an upstanding agency, he was far from proper. But
as for the CIA’s legacy of failure and lack of foresight, Casey fit right in. Reagan trusted Casey,
but Casey was not to be trusted. He was so bold as to change the conclusions of agents’ reports
to reflect his own political ideologies (Weiner 2008, 434-9). When he started, he immediately
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proved himself to be swift to action. Casey wanted to revitalize the Agency, boost morale, and
give it a new start. One of his first orders of business was to let go anyone who did not follow
orders quickly, or agents that were weak links. Agents who had little to offer the Agency were
quickly relieved of duty.
If there was one thing Casey had going for him at the beginning, it was his relationship
with the President; it was one of the closest relationships between the President and a DCI ever
seen. This coordination would allow the two to undertake secret wars in Afghanistan and
Nicaragua. But eventually the scandal leaked to the public in 1986. During investigations of the
Iran-contra debacle, Casey and those involved—including the President—denied any and all
involvement.
After he died in 1987, he left the Agency in shambles, leaving the DCIs to follow to clean
the mess he created. Before Casey, the Agency was dysfunctional at best. After he died and
DCI Judge Webster was inaugurated, the CIA was not ready to change, nor was it going to.
Weiner (2008) writes that after even Webster’s vow to remain honest with Congress in its
operations, it did not want to take any chances. Congress then took on even more oversight of
CIA operations. In any clandestine operations after 1987, the CIA would have to report to one of
various Congressional committees. No longer would the CIA work as a political instrument
(480). This was the first piece of legislation that was part of Congress’s package plan to have
oversight of the CIA. It later added Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991, which required the
President’s approval of clandestine missions abroad.
Saving a Sunken Vessel: George Tenet
George Tenet was born in New York in 1953. A Georgetown University graduate, he
went on to receive his Master’s in international affairs in 1978. From the start, his whole career
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had been in Washington. He began as a legislative aide to Senator John Heinz (R-PA) from
1982-1985, when he stayed in the Senate to work on the Senate Intelligence committee as a
staffer and eventually Director until 1993. At the end of DCI John Deutsch’s short tenure, Tenet
worked as Deputy Director until 1996, when he became standing Director when Deutsch
resigned. Filling the next hierarchy role, George Tenet was nominated to be the new Director of
Intelligence in 1997 (Diamond 2004).
Turner (2005) described that his mission, like DCIs John McCone and William Colby
before him, was to revitalize the Agency, from the inside out. He was concerned with the
institution’s ethics just as much as its bureaucratic inner workings. He sought vigorously to strip
the Agency, then modernize, strengthen, and reform it. The world was changing, and the
Agency needed to change with it. Computers, digital information, and the internet were
booming at the time, but the CIA was stuck in the days of the Cold War, using Cold War-era
methods and philosophies (Turner 2005, 240-46). Since the end of the Casey administration, the
CIA had suffered budget cuts and scrutiny from Capitol Hill; in recent years, the Agency has had
to do more with less. Austerity measures coupled with its broken bureaucratic systems left the
Agency in dismal shape. As one of the first orders of business, Tenet petitioned Congress for a
multi-billion dollar overhaul plan. Tenet promised a $1.8 billion stimulus plan and millions
more in miscellaneous funds would get the Agency in full working order by 2002. It was the
largest intelligence project since 1982, and Congress said that there was more to come (Weiner,
2008, 552-3).
Turner (2005) also described Tenet’s tenure as having a “global role” for the CIA. His
redirection of the Agency reshaped the overall image of the CIA. When Tenet was called to
facilitate Israeli-Palestinian peace talks in 1998, some feared the Agency was getting in to an
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arena it did not belong. “The CIA is not making policy,” Tenet said, “but helping carry it out.”
Tenet continued, “This is consistent with the agency’s history of fighting terrorism and helping
friends and allies in the region live together peacefully and safely.” As Islamic terrorism was
becoming an increasing threat, Tenet saw an opportunity to learn more about it to effectively
combat it.
Tenet fared well at the Agency because he boosted morale (he was often known as a very
down to earth guy) and succeeded in reviving the CIA until he reported incredibly faulty
intelligence on Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), which ultimately led to his
resignation in 2004. It appeared, at the time, that the words “success” and “CIA” just did not
coincide. As the future DCI Peter Goss states, “there aren’t any successes that are particularly
grand” (Turner 240-6).
Afghanistan
When the Soviets made one last push into Afghanistan to save the Republic, it could not
account for the might of a lone politician from the United States. Author George Crile (2003)
describes future senator Charlie Wilson as a child who had adopted the value of American
exceptionalism. His hatred for the Nazis as a boy fueled his hatred for the Soviets. He traveled
to Afghanistan and immediately took on the plight of the Freedom Fighters known as the
mujahidin. Their war was to become the next proxy war for the United States against the
Soviets. Wilson dedicated the rest of his political career to seeing the victory of the mujahidin.
After years of working through his own connections, he won over the attention of the CIA. After
some deliberation, Casey would eventually become very involved in Charlie Wilson’s war, as it
came to be called. In fact by 1985, over 50% of the Agency’s budget was devoted to the war in
Afghanistan. It would increase to 70% by the next year (Charlie Wilson’s War). The CIA was
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able to operate via Wilson’s connection to Pakistani president Muhammad Zia-al-huq. When
questioned in Moscow, Zia duped the Soviets in telling the Soviet secretary-general that Pakistan
was not involved in assisting the Freedom Fighters. Had Russia found out, it could have ignited
World War III. Through a common goal and a common enemy, the United States was able to
find another ally in the Middle East, a place that was quickly becoming a hotbed for antiAmerican sentiments. Had it not been for Wilson, the CIA’s involvement in Afghanistan may
have been delayed, and U.S. involvement may have played out much differently.
So, what happened between 1987 and 2001 that made our ally against the Soviets turn
against us and become our arch enemy? Crile (2003) states that this change from ally to enemy
began almost immediately following the end of the Afghan-Soviet war. In September of 1991,
the Senate Committee cut out Afghanistan from its annual budget. For the past decade, the U.S.
had been funding a secret war, and suddenly, had turned the other way. After cutting funding to
the Afghans, the United States no longer supported their revolution. After Desert Storm, our
troop presence in Saudi Arabia led most Muslims to believe we only wanted to take over the
Islamic oil fields in a plan to obtain world domination. To put it shortly, the Islamic people felt
betrayed. Osama bin Laden—a former mujahidin warrior—rose through the ranks to become
the world’s most wanted terrorist and preached of America’s infidelity and subsequently ignited
the al-Qaeda movement (Crile 507-23).
In the years to come, the Agency continued to make one blunder after another. A series
of botched bombings and missile strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan killed civilians and not
their intended targets; Tenet seldom allowed for more, and for good reason. He became so
prudent that when he received credible reports that bin Laden was in Afghanistan and the CIA
had the opportunity to take him out, Tenet refused the order (Weiner 2008, 545-8). This would
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not be the first time, but if he had allowed for one more strike, the Twin Towers may still be
standing over Manhattan today. After the attacks, the White House was trying to find
connections between al Qaeda and Iraq. Senior CIA officer Tyler Drumheller (2006) writes, “the
war…turned Iraq into a magnet and training ground for new terrorists who want to strike at the
United States.” Tenet was trying to tell the President that Iraq was not the place to be, and that
he should direct military efforts toward Afghanistan. This would be one of the few times when
the Agency was correct in their analyses.
Pakistan
Soon after the Soviets were pushed out of Afghanistan and the empire began to crumble
under its own weight, our relations with the Pakistanis were to turn cold. As Weiner (2008)
notes, the more intense Tenet’s battle to get bin Laden became, the more the mistakes that were
made—deadly ones. The CIA authorized the use of drone strikes and bombings to target areas
where supposed al Qaeda members were housed. All too often was the intelligence faulty and
the missiles killed civilians, or they did not even take out the intended the targets, such was the
case of the bombing of Khost in an attempt to neutralize bin Laden in 1999 (Weiner 2008, 542).
These bombings angered the Pakistani government. The United States’ mission was to take out
terrorists, not innocent civilians. Just as brutal attacks had instigated resentment of Americans in
Iraq in later years, Pakistan turned its back on America.
Today the relations between Pakistan and the United States are neither hostile nor
friendly. They have been known to harbor the Taliban and al Qaeda members, but to our
knowledge have not instigated attacks directly against us. It is for this reason that the war in
Afghanistan continues. Stephen (2012) stated that Pakistan, who wishes to assert their influence
in Afghanistan, is reluctant to negotiate with the United States (“The Right Way Out of
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Afghanistan”). Yet drone strikes in recent years have served to be quite successful, Plaw (2012)
reports. Citizen casualties have been minimal. Although numbers vary slightly, since the strikes
began in 2004, there have been approximately 83 civilian casualties, compared to 1,572 “lowlevel militant” casualties. “On September 3, 2008, the head of the Pakistani Army, General
Ashfaq Kayani, harshly condemned the US operation and vowed that the Pakistani Army would
resist such violations of sovereignty ‘at all costs.’” Soldiers have been known to fire warning
shots at ground troops and helicopters. The drones nonetheless continue to terrorize Pakistani
citizens. The operations have been harshly criticized abroad, regardless of how effective they
have been in eliminating both the Taliban and al Qaeda members, but because Pakistan
welcomes them, continuing to dismantle them creates a conflict of interest.
Iran
American influence in Iran goes back nearly to the very beginning of the CIA itself. In
1953, in an effort to control the oil fields, the CIA installed a dictator in Iran, the Shah. He ruled
with an iron fist, causing many bloody scenes in the streets and tyranny in the Iranian
government. Unstable political climates came to a head in 1979 when Iranians stormed the U.S.
embassy, taking 66 Americans hostage. President Reagan and Casey would inherit the crisis
from President Carter, but eventually they were released in 1981—444 days after captivity.
Around this time also, terrorism was beginning to gain global recognition. Airplane
terrorist hijackings had been occurring since the turn of the decade and even earlier than that, but
it was not as grave of a concern. Since 1974, the CIA had contacts in the Middle East that gave
them great intel on terrorist activities until 1978 when it lost Ali Hassan Salameh, chief of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (Weiner, 2008, 449-50). American intelligence was once
again in the dark, and has been ever since. American resentments were already brewing. After
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the hostage crisis, it increased dramatically. “After the 1979 Islamic revolution [Iran] quickly
became the world’s leading state supporter of terrorism,” Byman (2008) writes. . Iran seeks to
spread the Islamic message of purging all corruption from the world. It has supported groups
including al Qaeda from Lebanon to the Philippines. After the Revolution, the United States
imposed sanctions on Iran for its support of terrorism, and these continue to present day, also
creating nonpolitical relations with the State (Byman 2008).
In 1985, Lebanese Shiites took five Americans hostage. No amount of negotiating with
the Ayatollah Khomeini would release them. That year, the CIA was approached with an offer
to sell arms to Iran to attempt to improve relations (Casey had no intentions of doing so) and
fund their war against Iraq. Negotiating the hostages’ release became a top priority. After Israel
was allowed to sell some of its American arms to Iran, the U.S. did so soon after. In 1984,
Dictator Adolfo Calero of Nicaragua met with Col. Oliver North in a series of meetings to
further the assistance of the contras against the Sandistas. Prados (1986) wrote, “Reagan was
willing to do anything necessary to ensure success at contra military force.” After Congress had
passed the Boland Amendment, which made it illegal for the United States to aid the Nicaraguan
forces in any way, Reagan’s message to America that it would not tolerate nor aid terrorists
operations proceeded. Col. North was the mastermind behind the plan in what was to become
the Iran-Contra scandal (Prados 1986, 424-26). The U.S was accomplishing two tasks at the
same time, by using funds from the Iranian arms sales to free the hostages; the United States
could fund the contras. Casey was at first apprehensive of the idea, but eventually, he and
Reagan worked very closely with Col. North to orchestrate the money laundering. The United
States was also providing battle plans to Iraq in their war against Iran. When Iran made the same
request, John McMahon, deputy director of intelligence, offered Casey an eerie prophecy. He
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warned that the CIA was “aiding and abetting the wrong people. Providing defensive missiles
was one thing, but when we provide intelligence on the order of battle, we are giving the Iranians
the wherewithal for offensive action.” Casey ignored the message and it was business as usual
(qtd. in Weiner 2008, 468).
Iraq
The year 1980 marked the beginning of the second longest Gulf War in modern history.
Iraq invaded Iran in an effort to assert its regional dominance. By 1982, Iraq was put on the
offensive and was being driven back. In order to see Iran lose the war, the United States saw a
vested interest in supporting Iraq and its President, Saddam Hussein. Such support came in the
form of ammunition, vehicles, cluster bombs as well as financial aid and credits. These supplies
were no doubt turned on the U.S. army in the next decade. Casey and Reagan were adamant
about ensuring the Iraqi victory over Iran but at the same time condemning the use of chemical
or nuclear weapons, as Battle (2003) reveals. These were used on Iraqi dissidents, and very
sparingly in actual warfare.
When the war did end, Kuwait refused to forgive its debt on Saddam Hussein for
assisting in campaigns against the Iranians. Tense negotiations followed between Saddam,
President H.W. Bush and Gorbachev. Negotiations fell apart and Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990.
The United States responded in Operation Desert Storm, driving Saddam back and ending a
decade long alliance.
After the end of the first Gulf War, sources poured in saying Saddam had WMDs and the
CIA accepted these sources of intel as hard fact. As the CIA had done in the past, it continued to
blindly accept information from defectors to confirm their preconceived notions of an impending
war. Over an eight year period, the CIA collected empty information; little to none of it was
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true. Saddam had told the U.S. he had destroyed his weapons but left the facilities to produce
them open. The United States knew he was lying. This distrust would set the stage for the U.SIraqi relations in the years to come. But Weiner (2008) says Saddam’s actions can be justified.
It was a way for Saddam to be a good leader and save his country, even if he had to lie to do it.
Iraq was weak after two wars and piling debt, and if its enemies knew it was defenseless, that left
the nation prone to attack. Saddam had to deceive the world at large to make himself seem more
resilient and protect his citizens (Weiner 2008, 564-7).
Tenet’s faulty intelligence and preconceived notions resulted in the biggest military
flounder since the Vietnam War. President Bush heavily campaigned for unilateral aggression to
depose Saddam. His plans went from utopian diplomacy and implementing democracy to
military action with few in between. Despite having little concrete action to offer as to what
would happen to the Iraqi state after Saddam was gone, Bush declared Operation Iraqi Freedom
in March of 2003. Its mission was to run Saddam out of Iraq. But after Saddam left, the country
fell into lawlessness and chaos with no one to take charge. The United States did send
humanitarian aid to help refugees and U.S. troops that remained were given the task of training
Iraqi police and military so they could defend themselves. In January of 2004, intelligence
intercepted a letter written from al-Zarqawi, al Qaeda militant leader in Iraq, which called for
collective action from the Shia against the United States, igniting the secretarian war.
Insurgency gained momentum and the War on Terror spread to include Iraq until the Operation
ended in 2011. Today, the country is in the same category with Somalia; it is no closer to
progress. “The country has become something close to a failed state,” Parker (2012) stated. It
cannot provide basic services like running water, and in the political realm, there is no single

9

EIU Political Science Review

Freer

party. It is instead divided between Sunni and Shi’ites and the country is locked in fighting over
who will gain control (Parker 2012, 94).
The Intelligence-Presidential Complex
Through the legacies of Tenet and Casey and the presidents they served, the United
States experienced the worst attack on its soil since Pearl Harbor; what we are left with today is a
War on Terror that cannot be contained. Casey and Reagan’s close correspondence would prove
the most influential. They were able to focus foreign policy efforts, and achieve some temporary
success in Afghanistan, regardless of how it has affected us today (we must remember that
without foresight, success is defined by a goal that achieves its purpose).
On the contrary, President Clinton and DCI James Woolsey had no relationship. He
would infamously say, “I didn’t have a bad relationship with the president, I just didn’t have one
at all” (qtd. in Weiner 2008, 508). Clinton’s disdain for Woolsey as DCI would lend largely in
part to his short tenure; he would only last two years at the Agency, accomplishing nothing
significant. The relationship between President Bush and Tenet was a close one—at face value.
“Bush and Tenet met at the White House almost every morning…” Weiner (2008) recounts,
“But nothing Tenet said about bin Laden captured the president’s attention…Bush was interested
in other things…He was struck by no sense of emergency” (Weiner 2008, 552-3). Few would
speculate that Bush and Tenet would not get along well. Bush, a Republican, inherited Tenet,
who had a history of association with Democrats. In the years before 9/11, Tenet tried
desperately to get the President to pay attention to Afghanistan. The more he tried to “ring the
alarm,” as Helms had once put it, the more he was shut him out. In the years after the attacks,
Tenet flooded the White House of false reports of Saddam having WMDs. Whereas the White
House would fail in preventing 9/11, the CIA failed in preventing the next Iraq war. It was an
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even exchange with deadly consequences. The President’s and the CIA’s agendas did not
coincide, and so the failures of the Agency would persist. A correspondence was not the same as
co-operation. The burden of mistake in going into Iraq rests squarely in the space between Tenet
and President Bush. Success in American foreign policy lies in the co-operation between the
White House and the Director of Intelligence. The DCI must be regarded highly in the White
House if operations are to be successful. Though the CIA was initially supposed to be above
political influence—and it still can be—if it is to be successful in its mission to protect America,
it must rethink its research. Finding and tweaking analyses to support policy will continue to
lead to failures and blowback.
Preventing “Blowback”
The CIA defines its term “blowback” as the result of covert operations kept from the
American public, so that if and when retaliation occurs, Americans cannot put it into context.
An attack appears “out of the blue,” and our response to it appears patriotic rather than defensive
(Previewh 2006). It began in Afghanistan against the most frightful enemy the country had
known. The CIA armed, trained and funded its own enemy. In the early 1990s, inaction to
withdraw troops created a foreboding sentiment in the Arab world—one of distrust. That distrust
eventually culminated in militant attacks, flag burnings and the attack of 9/11 traced to an enemy
once believed to be the most auspicious of its day. Knowing no bounds, the United States’ effort
to eliminate this enemy spilt over into neighboring Pakistan. Frequent drone strikes, despite their
success, have angered Pakistanis because they are largely unauthorized and they terrorize
citizens. And in doing so, we have undermined their political and geographical sovereignty. In
retaliation, they welcome the Taliban and al Qaeda, in turn undermining our mission in the War
on Terror. So then, it seems, it is a paradox. If the Pakistanis weren’t to house our enemies, the
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United States would have no imperative to encroach on their borders. Our relations would be
much stronger, and thus co-operation in stabilizing Afghanistan would be stronger.
The beginnings of international terrorism lie in Iran. It is also the closest relationship
between the latter and how the Agency’s operations have backfired so severely. Though
terrorism was nothing new in the late 1970s, after the Iranian Revolution, it was certainly
validated. Iran’s isolation through American sanctions in turn created a Mecca for radical
Islamists. The sanctions also created Iranian autarky, which produced a need for generating its
own power, and nuclear energy was found to be the most efficient, spurning condemnation from
many nations in present day.
The Agency’s support of ruthless dictators has obviously proven to be a haunting policy,
but to say that Iraq was a direct result of the CIA’s operations as well, while apparent, cannot be
linked so easily. It is true that in Saddam Hussein aiding financially and militarily in his war
against the Iranians, the United States was in an area that looked like trouble to begin with. The
time between the First Persian Gulf war and Operation Desert Storm was unpredictable until it
was too late. The CIA did not think that Saddam would invade Kuwait until literally the day that
it happened. But looking at it from an economic perspective, Kuwait’s refusal to forgive
Saddam his debts (they had every right not to) would ultimately lead to some sort of friction.
Further, showing that the war on terrorism was justified in Iraq is a misnomer. The Bush
administration led Americans to believe that al Qaeda was there before 9/11. Rather, al Qaeda
came to Iraq in response to the deposing of Saddam in an effort to impose Sharia, or Islamic law.
U.S. troops were misdirected in focusing only on training the police force. Clearly, a nation in
chaos needs a police force to maintain order and a government without a legitimate presence
cannot, in turn, present a legitimate military. Bush should have improved the police and the
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government simultaneously, rather than hoping democracy would take hold. Not enough
deliberation was taken before deposing Saddam. Bush’s response to Iraq created a similar
circumstance to that of the late Vietnam War. An immature military could not suppress that of
an unpredictable, relentless enemy. But neither can the United States’ advanced military. So the
problem is not in with what weapons the war is fought, but the battle being waged in the minds
of the enemy, on which we still do not have a full grasp.
And so the war is no longer confined to Afghanistan or Iraq, nor is the war over. Citing
President Bush in his address to the nation after the September 11 attacks, Bach (2009) recalls:
“’[t]he only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and
destroy it where it grows’” (www.hsaj.org 3). When the enemy spreads, the war follows them.
Kraxberger (2005) acknowledges that after September 11, United States’ attention on Africa has
begun to resurface. Since 1994 and the fiascos in Mogadishu, Somalia; Rwanda and Sudan, U.S.
foreign policy in Africa has been almost nil. In recent years, terrorism has been the initiating
agenda for conducting foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa. Poverty and corruption serve as
breeding grounds where Islam is already an integral part of society. When the government’s
legitimacy is diminished, conflict erupts and Islamism has an opportunity to flourish in an effort
to restore order (Kraxberger 2005, 55-7). In the news today, they have been most prominent in
northern Mali where ethnic and tribal conflict has separated the country into northern and
southern regions. Somalia, declared a failed state in 1991, is also a port for terrorism and pirates
in the region. Some research also suggests that illegal blood diamond operations provide
funding for various organizations, let alone local thugs and warlords across the African
continent.
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Some might even say that fighting terrorism is as futile a war as the “war on drugs.” It
will always exist. As our relentlessness to terrorism increases, so too does the enemies’
resistance to supposed American imperialism. After the Berlin Wall came down and the Soviet
empire crumbled, there was confusion in the Central Intelligence Agency. For the past
generation, their mission had been to defeat an enemy they could not penetrate. Now that they
were gone, what was it? Nearly as a direct result of their operations, when the Twin Towers fell,
the CIA had their new mission, and the American people had a new fear; the Soviets became the
terrorists of today. But yet, we must emphasize: without diligence, no one could have foreseen
the events that transpired. Even for a spy agency, the future is far from predictable. But since its
inception, the Agency has gone beyond analyzing and collecting data. It has tried to shape
foreign policy the way they wanted it to be through dictators, coups and secret wars.
Government must react to the events of today in order to preserve tomorrow and prevent
yesterday from happening again.
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